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Abstract
We introduce a general decision-tree framework to value an option to invest/divest in a project,
focusing on the model risk inherent in the assumptions made by standard real option valuation
methods. We examine how real option values depend on the dynamics of project value and
investment costs, the frequency of exercise opportunities, the size of the project relative to
initial wealth, the investor’s risk tolerance (and how it changes with wealth) and several
other choices about model structure. For instance, contrary to stylised facts from previous
literature, real option values can actually decrease with the volatility of the underlying project
value and increase with investment costs. And large projects can be more or less attractive
than small projects (ceteris paribus) depending on the risk tolerance of the investor, how this
changes with wealth, and the structure of costs to invest in the project.
Keywords CARA · CRRA · Certain equivalent · Decision tree · Divestment · Hyperbolic
absolute risk aversion · Investment · Mean-reversion · Risk aversion · risk tolerance
JEL Classification C44 · D81 · G13 · G30
1 Introduction
The original definition of a real option, first stated by Myers (1977), is a decision opportunity
for a corporation or an individual. It is a right, rather than an obligation, whose value is
contingent on the uncertain price(s) of some underlying asset(s) and the costs incurred by
exercising the option. The term ‘investment’ real option concerns the opportunity to buy
or sell a project (such as a property—real estate, a company, a patent etc.) or a production
process (such as an energy plant, or pharmaceutical research and development). Following
Kasanen and Trigeorgis (1995), we identify the project value with a market price that is the
‘break-even’ price for which a representative decision maker would be indifferent between
buying or not buying the project. Any higher price would exceed her value and she would not
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buy the project; any lower price would induce her to certainly buy the project.1 Similarly, we
identify the option strike with the investment cost for the project and in the following we shall
use these two terms synonymously. The real option value (ROV) is the value of this decision
opportunity to buy or sell the project; it is specific to the decision maker (i.e. the investor)
and it will depend on her attitude to risk. The ROV represents the certain dollar amount, net
of financing costs, that the decision maker should receive to obtain the same utility as the
(risky) investment in the project. So, unlike the premium on a financial option, the ROV has
no absolute accounting value. In this setting, ROVs merely allow the subjective ranking of
opportunities to invest in alternative projects.2
The basic model for analysing investment real options assumes that the project value
follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) over a finite investment horizon, with a fixed
or pre-determined investment cost (i.e. the option strike), where all risks can be hedged so that
risk-neutral valuation (RNV) applies, and that decisions to invest or divest (i.e. exercise the
option) may be implemented at any time up to the investment horizon. Much recent literature
on investment real option analysis attempts to augment this basic model in various ways, to
add special features that address particular practical problems.3
However, our paper addresses a much more fundamental issue. Instead of following the
main strand of the real options literature, which adapts and extends the mathematical models
to more closely reflect the real-world characteristics of a particular investment opportunity,
we shall drill-down into the real option model itself to examine the model risk inherent in
the assumptions that are made for the decision. Here the term ‘model risk’ refers to the
real-option value lost from making a ‘wrong’ decision, where the wrong decision is captured
because we use inappropriate parameters in the model.
This paper develops a general model for real option valuation—with a utility which encom-
passes all the standard utility functions and with a price process which has the standard
geometric Brownian as a special case—then, by setting specific values for model param-
eters, we can assess the change in real option value arising from different decisions. For
example, suppose the project is owned by a firm whose board would wish to apply risk-
neutral valuation, but the decision-maker is a manager who uses her personal preference
function. Our general framework allows one to quantify how much value is lost by a board
with such a manager.
To this end, we provide comparative statics of real option values with respect to the risk
tolerance parameters of Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) utility. We also allow
general assumptions about: the market price of the project; the investment costs; the frequency
of exercise opportunities; the size of the project relative to the decision-maker’s wealth; the
1 We use the term ‘market price’ because this decision-maker’s value is representative of the market as a
whole.
2 For instance, just as financial investments are ranked using risk-adjusted performance measures, a phar-
maceutical firm may compare the values of developing alternative products, or an exploration company may
compare the values of drilling in different locations, or a property development corporation may compare
the values of buying land in different locations. The same utility function should be applied to value every
investment opportunity (this characterises the decision maker) but the decision-maker’s subjective views about
the evolution of future uncertainties (such as the value of a project and the associated costs of investment) is
specific to each project.
3 For example, in the renewable energy industry, technological developments now help small-scale production
projects gain competitive advantages, especially with various support schemes encouraging their adoption,
and several recent papers use real option methods to analyse the value of these developments. Dahlgren and
Leung (2015) model the value of an option to invest in a small-size production project taking into account
temporary suspensions; Boomsma et al. (2012) model the optimal capacity choice of producing renewable
energy under different support schemes; Farzan et al. (2015) value an option to invest in microgrid assets,
taking into account a variety of risks as well as the possibility of temporary suspension of production.
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decision maker’s utility function; and how her risk tolerance changes with wealth. To our
knowledge this is the first study of model risk associated with these factors, some of which
have not even been considered before.
We do not assume that risks can be hedged by traded securities, but risk-neutral valuation
techniques still apply in the special case of a linear utility function. In this case, Grasselli
(2011) proves that the time-flexibility of the opportunity to invest in a project still carries a
positive option value for a risk-averse decision maker, so that the paradigm of real options
can still be applied to value a decision where none of the risks can be hedged. We also assume
that the market price is the only stochastic factor and that the option strike may be—but is
not necessarily—related to the market price of the project.
In future work our general framework might be extendible to multiple correlated sources
of uncertainty, where partial hedging is possible. But it is already a considerable challenge
to build a model which is broad enough to encompass special cases corresponding to the
specific choices of project characteristics and investor preferences mentioned above. Indeed,
we already analyse a wide scope of questions about model risk, even without such model
extensions. For instance: How is the ROV affected if the drift in market price is mean-
reverting? How does the frequency of exercise opportunities affect the ROV? How does the
ranking of different opportunities change as we increase risk tolerance, or its sensitivity to
wealth? Does the size of the investment relative to initial wealth effect the ROV, and if so
how? And what is the effect of the fixed or pre-determined cost assumption relative to more
general assumptions that costs are stochastic?
In the following: Sect. 2 motivates our framework with a concise overview of the literature
on investment real option models; Sect. 3 specifies the model mathematically; Sect. 4 answers
the questions posed above assuming a GBM process for the market price of the project and
Sect. 5 examines the sensitivity of ROVs to changing the price-process assumptions; Sect. 6
summarises and concludes. An Appendix aids understanding of our framework with some
illustrative examples.
2 Real options to invest in a project
Most of the early literature on investment real options focuses on opportunities to enter a
tradable contract with pre-determined strike in a complete market. For early models including
a stochastic strike, see McDonald and Siegel (1986), Quigg (1993) and Kulatilaka (1998).
That is, the real option’s pay-off can be replicated using tradable assets, so that all risks
are hedgeable. Also, the decision opportunity can be exercised continuously at any time
over the decision horizon as, for instance, in Kogut (1991), Grenadier (1996), Smith and
McCardle (1998) and Patel et al. (2005). In this setting the option has the same value to all
investors and so is priced as if the investor is risk neutral using standard RNV techniques
for American options. Basic real option models also suppose the forward price follows a
geometric Brownian motion (GBM) with total return equal to the risk-free rate, and the ROV
is derived from a linear utility where exercise at a pre-determined strike may be taken at
any point in time. Capozza and Sick (1991), Trigeorgis (1993), Benaroch and Kauffman
(2000), Boer (2000), Yeo and Qiu (2002), and numerous others since all employ this basic
framework.
However, in practice, many investment opportunities encompassed by the original defini-
tion of Myers (1977) are not standardised, tradable securities; their risks are only partially
hedgeable, if at all; investors are typically risk-averse; and investment costs are unlikely to
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be pre-determined. So the RNV assumptions are clearly inappropriate for many real options,
particularly those in real estate, research & development or company mergers & acquisitions.
In many applications the underlying market is incomplete and the project is not something that
can be bought and sold in a market, indeed the transacted price may be negotiated between
individual buyers and sellers. In this setting there is no unique value for a real option—it will
be specific to the decision maker, depending upon her subjective views about the costs and
benefits of investment in the project, and upon her risk preferences. For instance, if an oil
exploration company must decide whether to drill in location A or location B, their views
about the benefits of drilling in each location will depend on their subjective beliefs about
the market price of oil in the future as well as their risk tolerance. Hence, there is no single
accepted definition in the real option literature for the stochastic price process which drives
the project value. For instance, Slade (2001), Moel and Tufano (2002), Adkins and Paxson
(2011), Chronopoulos et al. (2011), Alexander et al. (2012), Jaimungal et al. (2013) associate
the market price of the project as the value of the project’s outputs; Alvarez and Stenbacka
(2004), Bøckman et al. (2008), Fontes (2008), Franklin Jr (2015), Nunes and Pimentel (2017),
Mac Cawley et al. (2018) model the demand/production capacity and their market price is
the value of the products that generate the projects profit stream; and Muñoz et al. (2011),
Luo et al. (2016) use the net present value of the project’s future cash flows.
Several papers consider risk-averse decision makers in incomplete or partially complete
markets, often for decision makers with a utility function that admits closed-form solutions
via maximization of an expected utility. Henderson (2007), Miao and Wang (2007), Grasselli
(2011), Adkins and Paxson (2013) and Hagspiel et al. (2016) all investigate continuous-time,
deterministic-strike real options using a two-factor GBM framework in which the value of the
project to the investor is stochastic and possibly correlated with the price of a liquidly traded
asset that may be used to hedge the investment risk. In common with our approach, which is
described in detail in the next section, price processes are discounted to present value terms
so that a univariate time 0 utility function may be applied to maximise the expected utility
of the maturity pay-off.
The process of real option valuation also determines an optimal exercise, assuming that
this may occur at any time in a continuous future. In practice these opportunities may only
be possible at fixed discrete points in time, such as at a weekly meetings of the investment
committee or monthly meetings of the board of directors, but there is no research to date on
the effect of infrequent exercise opportunities on the ROV. Our framework allows a decision-
maker to quantify this effect. For instance, the optimal decision at time 0 may be to invest if
the market price falls by a given amount. But if the board controls the decision to exercise
the option, and the board meets only once per month or even less frequently, then the ROV is
likely to be lower than it is when exercise can happen at any point in time. How much lower?
This question can be addressed by designating a proper sub-set of nodes as decision nodes
in our general model.
Trigeorgis (1996), Smit (1996), Brandão and Dyer (2005), Brandão et al. (2005, 2008)
and Smith (2005) all employ decision trees but, unlike us, they assume market-priced risk
and thus adopt the RNV framework, avoiding the explicit use of a utility. Mason and Merton
(1985), Trigeorgis and Mason (1987), De Reyck et al. (2008) and Muñoz et al. (2011) also use
decision trees, but with a constant risk-adjusted discount rate. Only Grasselli (2011) applies
a utility function in a decision tree for real option valuation and the exponential (CARA)
utility that he applies has substantial limitations—see Sect. 3.4 for details.
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3 A general framework for investment real option valuation
We apply the general hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) utility, introduced by Mossin
(1968) and Merton (1971). We employ the HARA form because it encompasses all of the stan-
dard utility functions that have previously been employed in the real options literature—i.e.
the logarithmic, power (Henderson and Hobson 2002; Evans et al. 2008) and the exponential
(Grasselli 2011). In fact, HARA is even more general because it includes the hyperbolic
utility (which has not been applied before, in this branch of the literature).4 This way, we
use comparative statics to assess the sensitivity of the real option value to assumptions about
the form of utility. For instance, suppose the board and the senior manager of a firm currently
have the same risk tolerance λ but their risk tolerance changes differently with wealth. It
may be that the manager’s utility is exponential because her risk tolerance does not increase
with wealth, but the board has a power utility so their risk tolerance increases with wealth.
By setting the HARA parameter η to two different values, i.e. zero for the manager’s expo-
nential utility and λ for the board’s power utility, and keeping fixed all other features of the
model regarding beliefs about the underlying price process, we can assess the model risk of
this situation simply by examining the difference between these two real option values. The
downside of this generality is that analytic solutions are only available in special cases (e.g.
with an exponential utility and GBM) so the results in this paper are generated numerically.
However, all the code used in our paper is available to readers, to verify our results and to
adapt for their own use by changing the (numerous) model parameters.
When risks are un-hedgeable the forward market price measure is subjective to the decision
maker, with the risk-neutral measure arising as the special case of a linear utility and a risk-
free expected return. The decision maker holds subjective views not only about the evolution
of the market price but also about the stream of cash flows (if any) that would be realised if
she enters the investment or begins the project. In most applications cash flows would reflect
the individual management style of the decision maker, e.g. aggressive, expansive, recessive
etc. Our investment costs may have pre-determined and/or stochastic components.
Exercise opportunities are discrete and are modelled using a binomial price tree with
decision nodes, corresponding to the possibility for exercise, placed at every k steps until a
finite decision horizon T . The consequence of the decision (which is taken at time 0) is valued
at some finite investment horizon, T ′ > T .5 Additionally, the decision maker is characterised
by her initial wealth, w0 which represents the current net worth of all her assets, and a HARA
utility function U (w) which reflects her risk tolerance λ and how this changes with wealth.
3.1 Market prices and cash flows
All future market prices and cash flows are expressed in time 0 terms by discounting at the
decision-maker’s borrowing rate r .6 Thus the investor borrows funds at rate r to invest, rather
than financing the cost from her initial wealth, which is not available for investing in this
4 The HARA parameter values λ and η which correspond to these special cases are explained in Sect. 3.4.
5 We do not equate these horizons with the maturity of the investment, i.e. cash flows from the project may
continue beyond T ′, so the market price is not constrained to be the discounted expected value of the cash
flows.
6 This rate depends on the business risk of the project as perceived by the financer, not as perceived by the
decision maker. It may also depend on the decision-maker’s credit rating but this assumption is not common
in the real options literature.
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project.7 We suppose that r is a constant, risk-free rate. First we allow the market price of the
project to follow a GBM, as usual, so that the discounted forward market price pt evolves
as:
dpt
pt
= (μ − r) dt + σ dWt , for 0 < t ≤ T ′, (1)
where μ and σ are the decision-maker’s subjective views about the drift and volatility asso-
ciated with the market price pt , and Wt is a Wiener process. Then pt has a lognormal
distribution, pt ∼ log N
(
(μ − r) t, σ 2t).
It is convenient to use a binomial tree discretisation of (1) in which the price can move
up or down by factors u and d , so that pt+1 = pt u with probability π and otherwise
pt+1 = pt d . No less than eleven different binomial parameterisations for GBM are reviewed
by Chance (2008). Smith (2005), Brandão and Dyer (2005), Brandão et al. (2005, 2008),
Smit and Ankum (1993) and others employ the ‘CRR’ parameterisation of Cox et al. (1979).
However, the Jarrow and Rudd (1982) parameterisation, which is commonly used by option
traders, is more stable for low levels of volatility and when there are only a few steps in the
tree. Thus we set
m = [μ − r − 0.5σ 2]t, u = em+σ
√
t , d = em−σ
√
t and π = 0.5. (2)
Secondly, we employ a modification of (1) that represents a ‘boom-bust’ scenario via a
regime-dependent process, which trends upward with a low volatility for a sustained period
(0, T1] and downward with a high volatility for another sustained period (T1, T˜ ].8 This
construction has several applications, including modelling the impact of business cycles on
the market price, or the periodically collapsing price bubbles that are commonly experienced
in financial markets like real estate, gold, cryptocurrencies and so forth. Thus we set:
dpt
pt
=
{
(μ1 − r)dt + σ1dWt , for 0 < t ≤ T1,
(μ2 − r)dt + σ2dWt , for T1 < t ≤ T ′. (3)
Finally, we consider a case where the decision maker believes the market price will mean-
revert over a relatively short time horizon. To represent this we suppose the expected return
decreases following a price increase but increases following a price fall, as in the Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process:9
d ln pt = −κ ln
(
pt
p¯
)
dt + σdWt (4)
where the parameter κ denotes the rate of mean reversion to a long-term price level p¯ which
is directly related to the half-life of the mean reversion. Specifically, the half-life is given by
ln(2)/κ . Following Nelson and Ramaswamy (1990) (NR) we employ the following binomial
tree parameterisation for the discretised Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process:
u = eσ
√
t , d = u−1 (5a)
πs(t) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1, 0.5 + νs(t)
√
t/2σ > 1
0.5 + νs(t)
√
t/2σ, 0 ≤ 0.5 + νs(t)
√
t/2σ ≤ 1
0, 0.5 + νs(t)
√
t/2σ < 0
(5b)
7 To avoid additional complexity we do not consider that projects could be financed from wealth, even though
this would be rational if wealth is liquid and r is greater than the return on wealth, r˜ .
8 In this paper, we study the case when both T1 and T˜ are fixed.
9 When the log price follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process the market price is said to follow an exponential
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
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where
νs(t) = −κ ln
(
ps(t)u
p¯
)
(5c)
is the local drift of the log price process, and so the price process has local drift:
μs(t) = −κ ln
(
ps(t)u
p¯
)
+ 0.5σ 2 + r . (5d)
Note that when κ = 0 there is a constant transition probability of 0.5 and the NR parameter-
isation is equivalent to the parameterisation (2) with m = 0.
The cash flows may depend on the market price of the project (as do revenues from
pharmaceutical sales, for instance, or rents from a property). To capture this feature, we let
s(t) denote the state of the market at time t , i.e. a path of the market price from time 0 to time
t written as a string of u’s and d’s with t elements, e.g. s(3) = uud . Let CFs(t) denote the cash
flow in state s(t) at time t . Regarding cash flows as dividends we call the price excluding all
cash flows before and at time t the ‘ex-dividend’ price, denoted p−s(t). At the time of a cash
flow CFs(t) the market price follows a path which jumps from p−s(t) to p+s(t) = p−s(t) + CFs(t).
The investor does not receive CFs(t) if she invests in the project at time t , but she does receives
it if she divests in the project at time t .10 The dividend yield is defined as
δs(t) =
p+s(t) − p−s(t)
p+s(t)
. (6)
We assume that dividend yields are deterministic and time but not state dependent, using the
simpler notation δt . Then the cash flows are both time and state dependent.11
3.2 Costs and benefits of investment and divestment
Assumptions about costs are critical determinants of real option values. For example, if the
cost is stochastic and perfectly correlated with a martingale discounted project price then the
RNV price will be zero, yet a risk-averse investor could still place a positive value on such
a decision opportunity. We shall allow fixed, deterministic or stochastic investment costs
which may be related to the market price, because this is relevant to many practical situations
(e.g. purchasing land for development or investing in pharmaceutical research). Hence, the
investment cost at time t , in time 0 terms, is:
Kt = αK + (1 − α) g(p−t ), 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (7)
where K is a constant in present value terms and g : R → R is some real-valued function
linking the investment cost to the market price. Note that, while Kt is stochastic we have
10 The alternative assumption that she receives the cash flow at time t only when she invests is also possible.
The subscript s(t) denotes a particular realisation of the random variable that carries the subscript t , e.g. p+
uud
and p−
uud are the left and right limits of a realisation of pt when t = 3. From henceforth we only use the
subscript s(t) when it is necessary to specify the state of the market – otherwise we simplify notation using
the subscript t . Also, assuming cash flow is not received when divesting at time t , p−t is a limit of pt from the
right, not a limit from the left.
11 If the cash flow is not state dependent, then the dividend yield must be state dependent. The state dependence
of cash flows induces an autocorrelation in them because the market price is autocorrelated. For this reason,
defining an additively separable multivariate utility over future cash flows as in Smith and Nau (1995) and
Smith and McCardle (1998) may be problematic.
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not introduced any new source of uncertainty here. All the variation in Kt is driven by the
uncertainty in the project value via the second term of the equation.
The function g controls the correlation between costs and market price of the project.
For instance, cost is perfectly correlated with price when g is linear and increasing. When
α = 1 we have a standard real option with a pre-determined strike K , such as might be
employed for oil exploration decisions. When α = 0 there is only a variable cost, which
is a deterministic function of the market price p−t . This might be employed for real estate,
research and development or merger and acquisition options. The intermediate case, with
0 < α < 1 has an investment cost with both fixed and variable components.
We assume that initial wealth w0 earns a constant, risk-free lending rate r˜ , as do any cash
flows paid out which are not re-invested. Any cash paid into the project (e.g. development
costs) is financed at the borrowing rate r . The financial benefit to the decision-maker on
investing (action I) at time t is the sum of any cash flows paid out and not re-invested plus
the terminal market price of the project. Thus the wealth of the decision-maker at T ′, in time
0 terms, following investment at time t is
w It,T ′ = e(r˜−r)T
′
w0 +
T ′∑
s=t+1
e(r˜−r)(T ′−s)CFs + p−T ′ − Kt . (8)
Some projects pay no cash flows, or any cash flows paid out are re-invested in the project.
Then the financial benefit of investing at time t , in time 0 terms, is simply the cum-dividend
price p˜t,T ′ of the project accruing from time t . If a decision to invest is made at time t , with
0 ≤ t ≤ T , then p˜t,t = pt but the evolution of p˜t,s for t < s ≤ T ′ differs to that of ps
because p˜t,s will gradually accumulate all future cash flows from time t onwards. In this
case, when the decision maker chooses to invest at time t her wealth at time T ′ in time 0
terms is
w˜ It,T ′ = e(r˜−r)T
′
w0 + p˜t,T ′ − Kt . (9)
Note that if r˜ = r then also ∑T ′s=t+1 e(r˜−r)(T ′−s)CFs + p−T ′ = p˜t,T ′ in (8).
Similarly, if the decision maker already owns the project at time 0 and chooses to divest
(action S) at time t , the time 0 value of her wealth at time T ′ is
wSt,T ′ = e(r˜−r)T
′
w0 +
t−1∑
s=1
e(r˜−r)(T ′−s)CFs + p+t − p0. (10)
Note that p0 is subtracted here because we assume the investor has borrowed funds to invest
in the project. Alternatively, if there are no cash flows, or they are re-invested,
w˜St,T ′ = e(r˜−r)T
′
w0 + p˜0,t − p0. (11)
Finally, the wealth wDt,T ′ resulting from a defer decision at time t depends on whether she
invests (or divests) later on. This must therefore be computed using backward induction as
described in the next sub-section.
3.3 Optimal decisions and real option value
Denote the decision-maker’s utility function by U : R → R. As in any decision problem, we
shall compare the expected utility of the outcomes resulting from investment with the utility
of a base-case alternative, which in this case is to do nothing (so terminal wealth remains at
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w0 in time 0 terms).12 The option to invest at time t given a specific node s(t), has time 0
utility value U Is(t),T ′ = U
(
w Is(t),T ′
)
, but since w Is(t),T ′ is random so is U
I
s(t),T ′ , and we use
the expected utility
E
[
U Is(t),T ′
]
= E
[
U
(
w Is(t),T ′
)]
,
as a point estimate. Then, given a specific decision node at time t , say when the market is in
state s(t), the potential investor chooses to invest if and only if
E
[
U Is(t),T ′
]
> E
[
U Ds(t),T ′
]
,
and we set
E
[
Us(t),T ′
] = max
{
E
[
U Is(t),T ′
]
, E
[
U Ds(t),T ′
]}
. (12)
Since there are no further decisions following a decision to invest, E
[
U Is(t),T ′
]
can be evalu-
ated directly, using the utility of the terminal wealth values obtainable from state s(t) and their
associated probabilities. However, E
[
U Ds(t),T ′
]
depends on whether it is optimal to invest or
defer at the decision nodes at time t + 1. Thus, the expected utilities at each decision node
must be computed via backward induction.
First we evaluate (12) at the last decision nodes in the tree, which are at the time T that
option expires. These nodes are available only if the investor has deferred at every node up
to this point. We associate each ultimate decision node with the maximum value (12) and
select the corresponding optimal action, I or D. Now select a penultimate decision node;
say it is at time T − kt . If we use a non-recombining binomial tree to model the market
price evolution, it has 2k successor decision nodes at time T .13 Each market state s(T −kt)
has an associated decision node. Each one of its successor nodes is at a market state s∗(T )
that is attainable from state s(T − kt), and has an associated probability πs∗(T ) determined
by the state transition probability of 0.5, given that we employ the parameterisation (2).14
Using the expected utility associated with each attainable successor node, and their associated
probabilities, we compute the expected utility of the decision to defer at time T − kt . More
generally, assuming decision nodes occur at regular time intervals, the backward induction
step is:
E
[
U Ds(t−kt),T ′
]
=
∑
s∗(t)
πs∗(t)E
[
Us∗(t),T ′
]
, t = kt, 2kt, . . . , T − kt, T . (13)
At each decision node we compute (13) and associate the node with the optimal action
and its corresponding maximum expected utility. We repeat the backward induction until
we arrive at a single expected utility value associated with the node at time 0. Finally, the
12 For brevity, we only describe the backward induction step for the decision to invest but it is similar for
the decision to divest. That is, for the divestment decision we compare the expected utility of the outcomes
resulting from remaining invested with the utility of the alternative, to divest.
13 The recombining assumption simplifies the computation of expected utilities at the backward induction
step. However, we do not require that the binomial tree is recombining so the number of decision nodes could
proliferate as we advance through the tree. Note that the state price tree will recombine if cash flows are
determined by a time-varying but not state-varying dividend yield.
14 So if the tree recombines these probabilities are 0.5k , k0.5k , k!/(2!(k − 2)!)0.5k , . . . , k0.5k , 0.5k under
the JR parameterization (2). If the CRR parameterisation is employed instead the transition probabilities for
a recombining tree would be more general binomial probabilities.
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option value is the certainty equivalent (CE) of this expected utility, less the wealth resulting
from the base-case alternative, i.e. w0, where CE(w) = U−1 (E[U (w)]) for any monotonic
increasing utility U . The minimum value of zero applies when the project would never be
attractive whatever its future market price.
3.4 Risk preferences
Much previous research on decision analysis of real options, reviewed in Sect. 2, employs
either risk-neutrality or an exponential utility function, which may be written in the form
U (w) = −λ exp
(
−w
λ
)
, (14)
where w denotes the terminal (time T ′) wealth of the decision maker, expressed in time 0
terms and λ > 0 denotes her risk tolerance and γ = λ−1 is her risk aversion. Note that w is
a random variable taking values determined by the decision-maker’s (subjective) views on
the evolution of the market price and the decisions she takes before time T ′. Under (14) we
have
CE(w) = −λ log
(
−E[U (w)]
λ
)
. (15)
This function is frequently employed because it has special properties that make it particularly
tractable (see Davis et al. 2006, Chapter 6).
1. The exponential function (14) is the only utility with a CE that is independent of the
decision-maker’s initial wealth, w0.15
2. The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion is constant, as −U ′′(w)/U ′(w) = γ .
Thus, the exponential utility (14) represents decision makers with constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA) and λ in (14) is the absolute risk tolerance.
3. The CE of an exponential utility is additive over independent risks. When xt ∼NID(μ, σ 2)
and wT = x1 + · · · + xT then CE(wT ) = μT − (2λ)−1σ 2T .
Unfortunately, properties 1 and 2 are very restricting. A major critique is that CARA decision
makers leave unchanged the dollar amount allocated to a risky investment when their initial
wealth changes; indeed, the decision maker’s wealth has no influence on her valuation of the
option. Property 3 implies that when cash flows are normally and independently distributed
(NID) the decision-maker’s risk premium for the sum of cash flows at time t is (2λ)−1σ 2t ,
so it scales with time at rate (2λ)−1σ 2. This could be used to derive the risk-adjustment
term that is commonly applied to DCF models and in the influential book by Copeland et al.
(1990).16
Economic analysis is commonly based on an inter-temporal consumption framework, for
instance as in Smith and Nau (1995) and Smith and McCardle (1998). Here decision-marker’s
have a multivariate utility given by a sum of time-homogenous exponential utilities over
serially-independent future cash flows. These particular assumptions are necessary because
only then is the CE additive over independent random variables, and the ROV is obtained
by backward induction on the CE. But in finance it is standard to base all utility on final
15 In other words, adding a constant to w results in only in an affine transformation which does not change
the form of the utility. This is also known as the ‘delta’ property. It implies that we obtain the same option
value, and the same optimal decisions, whether w denotes the P&L or net wealth.
16 Setting μ exp[ra ] = μ − (2λ)−1σ 2 gives −ra = log[1 − (2λμ)−1σ 2], so ra ≈ (2λμ)−1σ 2.
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wealth with future values discounted to time 0 terms, as in Henderson (2007), Miao and
Wang (2007) and Grasselli (2011) and many others since.
This discounting is an essential element of our approach because it allows the backward
induction step to be defined on the expected utility relative to any HARA utility which is just
a univariate function of terminal wealth. It is very important to note that using exponential
preferences over independent cash flows in this framework will yield the same decision (to
invest, or to defer) at every node in the tree because the uncertainties faced at any time are
just scaled versions of the initial uncertainties. Therefore, to reach beyond the restricting and
trivial exponential-utility solutions, we shall assume decision makers are endowed with a
HARA utility, even though this comes at the expense of analytic tractability, which may be
written in the form:
U (w) = −(1 − η)−1[1 + η
λw0
(w − w0)]1−η−1 , for w > (1 − η−1λ)w0. (16)
where λ denotes the local relative risk tolerance, which increases linearly with wealth at the
rate η.17 Here both absolute and relative risk aversion can increase with wealth, depending on
the value of η. We consider four special cases: when η → 0 we converge to the exponential
utility; η = 1 corresponds to the displaced logarithmic utility; η = 0.5 gives the hyperbolic
utility; and η = λ yields the power utility.
4 Model risk under GBM
Investment real option values, and hence the ranking of alternatives, are influenced by a large
number of variables: (i) the fixed/variable cost structure of the investment; (ii) the scheduling
of exercise opportunities; (iii) the investor’s risk tolerance and its sensitivity to wealth; (iv)
the size of the project relative to the initial wealth; and (v) the decision-maker’s views on the
evolution of market prices. In this section we first investigate how the ROV depends upon
assumptions (i) and (ii) when decision makers have exponential utilities and the market price
follows a given GBM (1).18 Then we investigate (iii) by fixing the risk tolerance λ and seeing
how our assumption about the rate at which λ increases with wealth (which is zero in the
exponential case) influences the ROV. Then, for property (iv), employing both exponential
and logarithmic utilities for illustration, we show how the ROV changes with the size of the
project revenues relative to initial wealth. Investigations of the ROV sensitivities to expected
returns and volatility, and how the ROV behaves for market price processes other than GBM,
are dealt with in Sect. 5.
17 Note that an investor’s risk tolerance and its sensitivity to wealth may be specified using the techniques
introduced by Keeney and Reiffa (1993). Relative risk tolerance is expressed as a percentage of wealth,
not in dollar terms. So if, say, λ = 0.4 the decision maker is willing to take a gamble with approximately
equal probability of winning 40% or losing 20% of her wealth, but she would not bet on a 50:50 chance
(approximately) of winning x% or losing x%/2 for any x > 0.4.
18 From henceforth we set r˜ = r . In the previous section it was important to specify the model in all its
generality, but insights to model risk based on using different lending and borrowing rates is a less important
problem which is therefore left to future research. To this end, the downloadable code accompanying this
article allows one to set r˜ 	= r .
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4.1 Investment costs
A variety of investment cost assumptions are made in the literature.19 In some applications—
for instance, when a licence to drill for oil has been purchased, and the decision concerns
whether the market price of oil is sufficient to warrant exploration—a fixed-strike or pre-
determined cost assumption could be valid. However, in many cases, the investment cost is
linked to the market price. The assumption about the investment cost has a crucial influence
not only on the value of a real option and its optimal exercise strategy but also on their
sensitivity to changes in the input parameters. Most papers do not question the effect that the
cost assumptions have on the conclusions, ignoring the potential model risk introduced by
the cost assumptions, as noted by Slade (2001). She demonstrates that the real option value
modelled under a fixed cost assumption and a stochastic cost assumption, differ drastically.
Similarly, the constant drift assumption in GBM does not allow the modeller to analyse the
effect of decreasing/increasing trends in costs. Clearly, if the GBM drift decreases so that
expected costs decrease in future, the option value should increase. Fontes (2008) analyses
the effect that a GBM variable cost assumption has on the ROV and concludes that a more
appropriate process for variable cost would be mean-reverting.
A fixed cost, where α = 1 in (7), may be regarded as the strike of an American call
option, and the value is derived from the expected utility of a call option pay-off for which
the upper part of the terminal wealth distribution above the strike matters. The opposite
extreme (α = 0) focuses on the lower part of the terminal wealth distribution below the
current price p0, where the investment costs are lowest. Although log returns are similar
across the whole spectrum under the GBM assumption (1), changes in wealth are in absolute
terms and are greater in the upper part of the distribution than in the lower part. For this
reason an at-the-money fixed-strike assumption yields a greater real option value than the
invest-at-market-price assumption.20
We illustrate these properties with an option to purchase a project that has no associated
cash flows. Suppose the current market price of the project is $1 m and the investor believes
this will evolve according to (1) with μ and σ as specified in Table 1. The risk-free lending
and borrowing rates are both 5%. The investment horizon is T ′ = 5 years, investors have an
exponential utility with risk tolerance λ, and the initial wealth is $1 m. As λ → ∞ we have
a linear utility, giving the option value for a risk-neutral decision maker, and further setting
μ = r gives the RNV solution. Decisions are made once per year, so we set t = k = 1.
Using (2) we have m = 0.03, u = 1.259, d = 0.844 and π = 0.5. The investment cost
takes the general form (7) with K = $1 m. We set g(x) = x and compare investment cost
at market price (α = 0) with fixed time 0 cost (α = 1) and a mix of fixed and variable cost
(α = 0.5). We also consider g(x) = x/2 for variable cost at a fraction (in this case one-half)
of the market price, plus a fixed cost if α > 0, and set g(x) = √x for a variable cost that
increases non-linearly with market price, so the price and cost are not perfectly correlated.
When g(x) = √x the variable cost is less than (greater than) the current market price p−t if
p−t >$1 m (p−t <$1 m).
Table 1 compares the ROVs under each cost assumption, for different decision makers
with λ = 0.1, 0.5 and 1, with the ROV corresponding to the linear utility of a risk-neutral
19 Among many others: Chronopoulos et al. (2011) and Alvarez and Stenbacka (2004) use fixed investment
costs; deterministic costs are applied by Mac Cawley et al. (2018), Dahlgren and Leung (2015) and Franklin Jr
(2015); Choi et al. (2017) and Muñoz et al. (2011) have stochastic investment costs; and Fontes (2008) assumes
a mixture of fixed and stochastic costs.
20 However, this property only holds under GBM views for market prices, see Sect. 5.2 for a counter example
under different price processes.
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decision maker (λ = ∞ and μ = r ). Under the option value we report the optimal exercise
strategy, denoted by year and any market state that it is conditional upon. For instance, 1/d
denotes invest at time 1 provided the market price moved down between time 0 and 1, and
4/uu denotes invest at time 4 provided the market price moved up between time 0 and 1, and
again between time 1 and 2, irrespective of later market price moves. Investment at time 0
has no market state, 4/− denotes invest in year 4 irrespective of the price state, and never
invest is marked simply −.
The option value increases with λ, as in Henderson (2007), because the more risk tolerant
the decision maker, the lower the risk premium required to invest. As λ → ∞ the value
converges to the risk-neutral (linear utility) value, which is greater than the standard RNV
option price because, in this case, μ > r . Clearly, the risk-averse ROV can be much less than
it is under RNV especially when risk tolerance is low, or much greater than it is under RNV
especially when risk tolerance is high. Indeed when α = 0 and g(x) = x , i.e. the investment
cost is at the market price, the RNV price is always zero: the CE of a linear utility is the
expected value of terminal wealth, and since the discounted price is always a martingale
under the risk-neutral measure, CE = w0; so RNV price of an opportunity to invest at market
price is always zero. By contrast, the risk-averse decision maker places a positive value on
the option in this case, except when λ = 0.1, when she would choose not to invest at any
market price.21
The cost structure also affects the exercise strategy. For a finite λ the optimal time to
invest is never shorter than for the risk-neutral decision maker, as shown by Henderson
(2007). Further, when α = 0 and g(x) = x , optimal investment is never conditional on a
price rise, though it may be conditional on a price fall. Investment also becomes conditional
on a price fall but not a rise when α = 0 and g(x) = kx , for 0 < k < 1, except that ‘never
invest’ is not possible, since the last period pay-off is x − kx > 0 so an optimal strategy
always invests at or before the last period of the option. But when g(x) = √x the last period
pay-off x − √x > 0 only when x > 1, i.e. after price rise, and optimal investment becomes
conditional on up moves. Although we only display results for k = 0.5 a similar conclusion
holds for other k with 0 < k < 1. When α = 0.5 or 1 there is a fixed cost component with an
at-the-money call option pay-off which is positive only if the price rises. Thus, in Table 1 any
condition on optimal exercise is for up moves in price. Finally, the RNV approach typically
(but not always) gives an optimal time of investment that is later than the optimal time for a
risk-neutral decision maker.
4.2 Exercise opportunities
We find no previous research in the real options literature which examines the effect of
introducing infrequent exercise opportunities, although in the financial options literature,
these are called Bermudan options. Whether time is discrete or continuous, real option models
have previously always assumed that decisions made at time 0 for optimal investment at
some time t ≥ 0 can always be implemented at that time t . In this section we show how
our general framework can model this feature by designating a sub-set of special nodes
in the tree as the only opportunities for exercising the investment. The ROV should not
decrease when there is more flexibility in the timing of investments. If the decision never
changes as a result of including more or less decision nodes, the option value will remain
21 These observations are not specific to the parameters chosen for Table 1. Qualitatively similar properties are
evident using other real option parameters, as can be verified by changing the parameters of the downloadable
code.
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Table 2 Effect of frequency of exercise opportunities on real option value
λ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 ∞
α = 0: invest at market price
k 12 109.5 1132 3712 8197 14,480 645,167
6 142.2 1344 4309 9212 16,089 645,167
3 163.9 1471 4618 9803 17,022 645,167
1 176.9 1553 4828 10,185 17,624 645,167
α = 1: fixed strike with present value $1 m
k 12 49,385 115,086 174,731 223,201 263,614 881,419
6 71365 144,638 204,078 252,243 292,632 908,333
3 86,062 157,289 214,375 263,019 303,834 919,322
1 93,115 166,450 225,568 273,619 313,888 926,058
w0 = p0 = $1 m, T ′ = 5 years,t = 1/12, T = T ′ − kt, r = 5%, μ = 15%, σ = 50%. Exponential
utility, different λ and k
unchanged. Otherwise, the ROV increases as more decisions are allowed. Having fewer
nodes for exercise opportunities places more constraints on the investment opportunity so
the project will become less attractive to any decision maker.
The results in Table 2 quantify this effect.22 We again consider an opportunity to invest in
a project with no associated cash flows and current market price $1 m. The decision maker
has an exponential utility and the real option is characterised by the parameter values given
in the legend to the table. Thus, there are 60 monthly steps in the binomial tree for the market
price, we place decision nodes every k steps in the backward induction algorithm (13), and
the last exercise opportunity is at T = T ′ −kt . For instance, if k = 12 the nodes occur only
once per year and the last exercise opportunity is taken at the fourth year. So that the four
decision trees are nested the values considered for k are 12, 6, 3 and 1 representing decision
evaluations once per year and once every 6 months, 3 months and 1 month. For decision
makers with different levels of risk tolerance λ, Table 2 reports results for the two extreme
cost cases: the upper part shows the value of the option to invest at market price and the lower
part shows the value of the option to invest at a fixed cost K = $1 m. In both cases the option
values increase when more decision nodes occur in the tree, i.e. as k decreases.
4.3 Risk tolerance
ROVs for risk-averse decision makers always increase with risk tolerance, but they can
be greater than or less than the RNV option price, depending on the decision maker’s risk
tolerance and their expected return on an investment. Two recent papers examine the effect of
changing risk tolerance on the value of a real option. Chronopoulos et al. (2011) employ a one-
factor setting where investment costs consist entirely of risky cash flows, so the marginal cost
of investing will increase with risk aversion. Assuming a GBM project value with continuous
investment opportunities for a decision maker with HARA utility, the authors show that the
marginal benefit of waiting to invest decreases relatively more than costs, as risk aversion
increases. As a result, the marginal utility of the pay-off increases, thereby increasing the
22 It is important that the trees are nested, i.e. no new decision nodes are inserted as their number decreases,
because only in this way does reducing the number of nodes capture the effect of placing additional constraints
on decision opportunities.
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Fig. 1 Comparison of invest option values under exponential, logarithmic, power and hyperbolic utilities as
a function of risk tolerance. Real option values on the vertical scale have been multiplied by 1000 for clarity.
Parameters are as in (17)
incentive to postpone investment and the ROV decreases as risk aversion increases. Using
a CRRA utility, but in a two-factor GBM setting, Choi et al. (2017) confirm this result.
They introduce a model where the decision-maker’s risk attitude depends on her subjective
discount rate for the expected utility of the option pay-off, with a lower discount rate being
associated with more risk-averse behaviour. As the investor’s risk tolerance increases so also
does the ROV and the later the optimal timing of the investment.
This section generalises the above result to the HARA utility case to ask how the assump-
tion made about the rate change of risk tolerance with wealth influences the ROV. To this
end we assume the local relative risk tolerance coefficient is λ at time 0 and that it increases
with wealth linearly at rate η. To benchmark HARA utility ROVs against exponential utility
ROVs, which have constant absolute risk tolerance λ, we set w0 = $1 m. Thus, λw0 = λ,
i.e. the absolute risk tolerance is the same for all utilities at the time of the decision. Figure 1
considers the options to invest (a) at market price and (b) at a fixed time 0 cost equal to the
current market price. We suppose the current market price is p0 = $1 m and the other real
option characteristics are:
T ′ = 5 years, K = $1 m, g(x) = x, t = 1/12, k = 3,
r = 5%, μ = 15%, σ = 50%. (17)
The lines in each figure depict the exponential, logarithmic, hyperbolic and power utility
ROVs as a function of λ, with 0 < λ ≤ 1. For typical value of risk tolerance (0 < λ < 1)
the exponential and logarithmic utility-based option values provide lower and upper ROV
bounds, respectively and the ROVs derived from other HARA utilities lie between these
bounds. At very high risk tolerance, i.e. λ > 1, hyperbolic utility values still lie between
the exponential and logarithmic values, but the power utility values exceed the logarithmic
values, and as λ increases further the power values can become very large indeed because
the risk tolerance increases extremely rapidly with wealth.
Because of the boundary in (16) HARA utilities are not always well-behaved, unlike
exponential utilities. But we have shown that exponential utility option values are too low
when the decision maker’s risk tolerance increases with wealth, which is a more realistic
assumption than CARA. For typical values of risk tolerance, power utilities produce reliable
123
Annals of Operations Research
ROVs, but with very high risk tolerance logarithmic or hyperbolic utility representations
maybe more appropriate, the former giving ROVs that are greater than the latter. Note that
these results also show that we can use exponential and logarithmic utility-based option values
as lower and upper bounds for other HARA utility values, within the range 0 < λ < 1.
4.4 Relative size
The larger the project relative to the decision-maker’s initial wealth w0, the higher the current
project price and (for fixed μ and σ in the GBM) the more variable the terminal change in
wealth. Hence, if the decision-maker is very risk averse, the ROV is likely to decrease as
the project size increases (relative to wealth). However, if the decision-maker has very high
risk tolerance the opposite could occur, i.e. ROV might actually increase with project size,
relative to inital wealth.
We have found no previous investigation into these questions and how the answers relate to
the structure of the investment costs. The closest work is in Choi et al. (2017) who argue that,
for CRRA utilities with fixed investment costs, ROVs will increase as the size of the project
relative to initial wealth decreases. Note that a similar effect can be present for CARA utilities:
even though the exponential utility-based option value is independent of initial wealth, as
previously noted in Sect. 3.4, CARA ROVs still depend on the volatility of the option pay-off,
and this increases with the size of the investment in the project.
In this section we use our model to quantify the effects of project size by fixing initial
wealth w0 at $1 m and supposing p0 is either $0.1 m, $1 m or 10$ m, keeping all other real
option characteristics fixed, at the values (17). We only depict exponential and logarithmic
ROVs because, from the previous section, these are approximate lower and upper bounds for
HARA utilities.
Figure 2 displays the ROV for different values of the local risk tolerance λ between 0.1
and 100, both axes being drawn on a base 10 log scale. We go beyond the range 0 < λ < 1
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Fig. 2 Real option values under exponential and logarithmic utilities as a function of risk tolerance λ, T ′ = 5,
t = 1/12, k = 3, r = r˜ = 5%, μ = 15%, σ = 50%, K = p0 = $0.1, $1, $10 m, w0 = 1m,
0.1 ≤ λ ≤ 100, ROV in $m. Both axes in log10 scale
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to examine the convergence of ROVs as λ → ∞, for comparison with the RNV case. We
depict ROVs for α = 0 (invest at market price) on the left, and α = 1 (fixed ATM strike at
p0) on the right. The values for the largest investment (p0 = 10 w0) are represented by red
lines, those for the smallest investment (p0 = 0.1 w0) are in black and those for the medium
investment (p0 = w0) are blue. In each case as λ → ∞, the ROV converges to the value
obtained for a risk-neutral investor, which increases with p0.
In both figures, the relative size of the investment in the project governs the sensitivity of
the ROV to λ, with larger investments having ROVs that are more sensitive to risk tolerance.
Consider the left-hand figure (α = 0) where the option is to invest at market price (Kt = p−t )
and hence the RNV option price is zero. Given that the drift and volatility of the GBM process
driving the market price dynamics is not affected by p0, all decision makers with 0 < λ < 1
will prefer the smaller investment to the larger ones, but as risk tolerance increases the larger
investments become more attractive than the smaller ones. Also note that the parameter η, i.e.
the rate at which risk tolerance grows with wealth, has much lesser effect on the ROV since
exponential and logarithmic values remain close to each other throughout. As λ increases the
ROVs converge towards the risk-neutral subjective value, which is non-zero (because μ 	= r )
and which increases with project size.
By contrast, in the right-hand Fig. 2 where the costs Kt are fixed at $1 m (i.e. α = 1)
the RNV, marked by the dotted horizontal line, is non-zero. It is less than the risk-neutral
subjective value to which the ROV converges as λ → ∞, simply because we have chosen
μ > r in this case; if we had set μ < r the RNV would exceed the asymptotic value in the
figure, irrespective of the investment size.
As we move from a variable to a fixed cost structure the main difference is that larger
investments are always ranked highest. The exponential ROV (solid lines) are now well below
the logarithmic ROV (dashed lines) showing that assumptions about η can be important,
especially for a highly risk-averse decision maker facing the fixed-strike option to invest in a
high-priced project. In general, risk-neutral decision makers attribute higher ranks to larger
investments; risk-averse decision makers also tend to prefer larger fixed-strike investments;
but when an investment is at market price, smaller investments are ranked more highly even
by investors with very low values risk-aversion.
5 Model risk in price process dynamics
Slade (2001) introduces a model with three state variables—price, cost, and reserves, find-
ing that the dynamic models that are selected for these processes greatly affect the ROV.
In particular, the option values associated with non-stationary processes are systematically
larger than the comparable stationary values. Also, assuming a GBM for price/cost processes
substantially overvalues the option value relative to the mean-reverting case. However, with
two notable exceptions (discussed in more detail below) all the real-options literature which
examines the sensitivity of real options to assumptions made about the price process employs
the risk-neutral paradigm.
Section 5.1, examines how the parameters of a GBM price process affect the ROV. This
problem has been analysed in many previous papers, albeit within a particular real-world
application where other basic assumptions are made—typically RNV. So we set our more
general results, based on HARA utilities, in the context of this research.23 Next, in Sect. 5.2
23 The decision maker has subjective values for μ and σ , but these may be highly uncertain if she lacks
confidence in her views. Indeed, while the decision maker can lose her patience of waiting which leads to an
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we consider an option to invest in a project when the decision maker’s views are captured by a
‘boom-bust’ process (3) where a long period of positive price momentum could be followed
by a crash. The question of model risk has not previously been analysed in this context.
Finally, in Sect. 5.3 we analyse real options for decision makers who believe in a mean-
reverting price process (4). There is some previous literature on this extension, reviewed
below, but all the papers that we can find are based on RNV.
5.1 Risk sensitivity
ROVs may decrease or increase with volatility, depending on the cost structure of the project
and the decision maker’s risk preferences. Much prior work, based on a variety of different
assumptions for the underlying price process, costs and the valuation measure, finds that ROVs
increase with volatility.24 Only a few papers challenge this result, arguing this relationship
can be reversed in some circumstances. For instance, Alvarez and Stenbacka (2004) assume
a fixed cost and a concave utility, and argue that the increase in the volatility can decrease the
option value of waiting when the expected utility of the option’s pay-off is a convex function
over time. Choi et al. (2017) assume a GBM cost and a CRRA utility, and demonstrate that
the ROV can decrease with volatility when the discount rate is low enough. In this section
we use our general framework to capture a drastic decrease or increase in the ROV as σ
increases, thus demonstrating that the sensitivity of the ROV to volatility depends heavily on
the model assumptions.
Figure 3 depicts the values of a real option to invest as a function of the drift and volatility
of the GBM market price process, with other parameters fixed as stated in the legend. When
α = 0 (left-hand figure) the option value always decreases as uncertainty increases due to
the risk aversion of the decision maker. For high uncertainty (σ greater than about 30%)
the exponential utility-based option values are zero: the investment opportunity is valueless
because the price would never fall far enough (in the decision maker’s opinion) for investment
to be profitable. By contrast, the logarithmic utility always yields a positive value when
expected return is greater than about 10%, but again the decision maker becomes more likely
to defer investment as the volatility increases. Indeed, the option values are monotonically
decreasing in σ at every μ, and monotonically increasing with μ for every σ . However, the
ROV volatility sensitivity is quite different for the fixed-strike option, i.e. for α = 1. For
instance, the logarithmic ROV can decrease as σ increases, when μ is low. When μ = r the
logarithmic ROV increases monotonically with σ , as in the RNV case.
Footnote 23 continued
increase in the discount rate applied to the expected utility of the option pay-off it is perhaps more likely that
she is highly uncertain about her views, and subsequently adjusts her subjective values for μ and σ . In this
case, it will be important to examine the sensitivity of ROVs to the expected returns and risks of the project.
24 A selection of recent literature that supports this relationship includes: Franklin Jr (2015), Chronopoulos
et al. (2011), Bøckman et al. (2008) and Alvarez and Stenbacka (2004)—these assume a GBM price process;
Mac Cawley et al. (2018) and Muñoz et al. (2011)—these papers set a mean-reverting price process; Regarding
costs, of course RNV option prices always increase with volatility when these are fixed—but more generally,
Mac Cawley et al. (2018), Franklin Jr (2015), Chronopoulos et al. (2011) and Alvarez and Stenbacka (2004)
assume with a fixed or deterministic investment cost, whilst Muñoz et al. (2011) and Bøckman et al. (2008)
set the investment cost to be stochastic; for the valuation measure Mac Cawley et al. (2018), Franklin Jr
(2015), Bøckman et al. (2008) and most of the other papers cited here value the option under the risk-neutral
measure—exceptions include Chronopoulos et al. (2011), who adopt a HARA utility, Alvarez and Stenbacka
(2004) consider a concave utility and Muñoz et al. (2011) employ the physical measure with a risk-adjusted
discount rate.
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Fig. 3 Option values under exponential and logarithmic utilities with λ = 0.2, as a function of the investor’s
subjective views on expected return μ and volatility σ . ROV value in $m for p0 = $1 m, w0 = $10m, r =
5%, T ′ = 5,t = 1/12, k = 3
The sensitivity of the option value to bothμ andσ also decreases as risk tolerance increases.
To illustrate this we give a simple numerical example, for the case α = 0 and an exponential
utility. Suppose μ = 20%. If λ = 0.2 the option value is $1148 when σ = 40% and $241, 868
(almost 211 times larger) when σ = 20%. When λ = 0.8 the option value is $167, 716 when
σ = 40%; but now when σ = 20% it only increases by a multiple of about 4, to $713, 812.
Similarly, fixing σ = 20% but now decreasing μ from 20 to 10% the value changes from
$241, 867 to $109 (2, 210 times smaller) for λ = 0.2, but from $713, 812 to $113, 959 (only
about 6 times smaller) when λ = 0.8. Hence, the option value’s sensitivities to μ and σ are
much greater for low levels of risk tolerance. Similar, but less pronounced, effects are present
with the logarithmic and other HARA utilities, as can be verified using the downloadable
code.
5.2 Momentum
Many markets are subject to booms and recessions, or periodically collapsing bubbles. To
name a few examples: the price of gold—which underpins associated mining projects—
recently reached a peak in 2016, since when it has been generally declining; surges in the
price of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin have caused the value of projects based on Initial Coin
offering (ICOs) to rise and fall over long periods during the last few years; and the real-estate
market has experienced several booms and busts since the second world war.
Clearly, when the investment horizon is many years away, a decision maker may wish
to take account of long periods of upward and/or downward trending markets in her views
about expected returns. For illustration, consider a simple boom-bust scenario over a 10-year
horizon: the expected return is negative, μ1 < 0 for the first n years and positive, μ2 > 0 for
the remaining 10 − n years. Deriving approximate parameter values from observations on
real estate values,25 we set μ1 = −10%, σ1 = 50% and μ2 = 10%, σ2 = 30%. We suppose
25 The average annualised return computed from monthly data on the Vanguard REIT exchanged-traded fund
(VQN) from January 2005 to December 2006 was 21% with a volatility of 15%. However, from January 2007
to December 2009 the property market crashed, and the VQN had an average annualised return of −13% with
a volatility of 58%. But from January 2010 to June 2011 its average annualised return was 22% with volatility
24%.
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Table 3 Effect of a time-varying drift for the market price, with downward trending price for first n years
followed by upward trending price for remaining 10 − n years
n 0 2 4 6 8 10
α = 0
λ 0.2 866 382,918 727,922 438,482 174,637 0
0.8 211,457 1,230,035 2,297,909 1,148,695 370,354 0
1.0 266,752 1,349,295 2,552,434 1,300,724 406,567 0
∞ 648,173 2,234,361 4,777,950 5,308,672 1,045,800 0
α = 1
λ 0.2 164,721 391,060 552,578 194,371 51,040 5022
0.8 392,866 961,279 1,704,007 692,529 159,663 14,943
1.0 432,280 1,064,416 1,938,157 821,733 186,257 17,191
∞ 740,493 1,989,551 4,339,659 4,860,376 841,706 50,787
Exponential utility with different levels of risk tolerance, with λ = ∞ corresponding to the risk-neutral
(linear utility) value. Real option values in bold are the maximum values, for given λ. p0 = $1 million,
w0 = $1 million, T ′ = 10, t = 0.25, k = 1, T = T ′ − t , r = 5%, μ1 = −10%, μ2 = 10%, σ1 = 50%
and σ2 = 20%
decisions are taken every quarter with t = 0.25 and set r = 5% in the price evolution tree.
The ROVs given in Table 3 are for decision makers having exponential utility, with varying
levels of risk tolerance between 0.2 and 1 and the recession is believed to last n = 0, 2, 4, 6, 8
or 10 years.26
When n = 0 or n = 10 we have a standard GBM price process, so for any given λ the
project in the upper of the table, with the invest-at-market-price option (α = 0) has a lower
ROV than the ROV for the project with the fixed-strike option (α = 1) in the lower part
of the table. However, for intermediate values of n the invest-at-market-price option often
has a higher value than the fixed-strike option. This ordering becomes more pronounced as
n increases, because when α = 0 the investment cost decreases with n, and if the price
rises after investment the profits will be greater than for the fixed-cost option. Irrespective of
cost structure, in this example the preferred investments are those for which boom and bust
periods are of roughly equal length.
5.3 Mean reversion
Some earlier research analyses investment real options based on mean-reversion in the project
value process but, like Slade (2001), these papers assume risks can be perfectly hedged and
therefore employ RNV: Mac Cawley et al. (2018) consider a discrete time model with deter-
ministic costs where the underlying commodity price is mean-reverting; and in a two-factor
continuous-time setting with mean-reverting project value and investment costs, Jaimungal
et al. (2013) show that the investment threshold depends on the ratio between project value
and cost.
In the risk-neutral world it is well-known that an option value will decrease as the mean-
reversion becomes stronger; in a sense, increasing the speed of mean-reversion is similar to
decreasing volatility. Is this also the case when we apply utility valuation for a risk-averse
26 Results for the divest option, or for the invest option under different utilities are not presented, for brevity,
but are available on request. The qualitative conclusions are similar.
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Fig. 4 Comparison of option values under HARA utilities with respect to mean-reversion rate κ . w0 = $1 m,
r = 5%, k = 1 and λ = 0.4 T ′ = 10, t = 1/4, K = p0 = $1 m, T = T ′ − t , σ = 40%.
Characteristic time to mean-revert φ = t/κ in years, e.g. with t = 1/4 then κ = 0.02 → φ = 12.5 years,
κ = 0.1 → φ = 2.5 years
investor? We can use our model to answer this question by examining how a risk-averse
decision-maker’s belief in price mean-reversion influences her ROV. To this end we assume
the price of the project follows the OU process (4) with p¯ = p0. We employ the NR
parameterisation (5), allowing the speed of mean reversion κ to vary between 0 and 0.1,
the case κ = 0 corresponding to GBM and κ = 0.1 giving the fastest characteristic time to
mean revert of 10 time-steps (so, assuming these are quarterly, this represents 2.5 years).27
The other parameters are fixed, as stated in the legend to Fig. 4, which displays the real option
values for α = 0 and α = 1 as a function of κ .
Increasing the speed of mean-reversion has a similar effect to decreasing volatility. Hence,
fixed-cost option values can decrease with κ , as they do on the right graph of Fig. 4 (α = 1)
especially when the decision maker has logarithmic utility. By contrast, the invest-at-market-
price (α = 0) option displays values that increase with κ . Note that for fixed κ these values
could increase with σ , due to the positive effect of σ in the local drift (5d).28
Now consider a risk-neutral decision maker who wishes to rank two investment opportu-
nities, A and B. Both have mean-reverting price processes but different κ and σ : project A has
a relatively rapid mean-reversion in its price (κ = 1/10, φ = 2.5 years) with a low volatility
(σ = 20%) and project B has a relatively slow mean-reversion in its price (κ = 1/40, φ = 10
years) with a higher volatility (σ = 40%). Such an investor would have a great preference
for project B since she is indifferent to the high price risk and has regard only for the local
drift. Given the slow rate of mean-reversion, she sees only the possibility of a sharp fall
in price—at which point she would invest—followed by a long upward trend in its price.
Indeed, assuming p0 = p¯ = $1 m the risk-neutral value of option B is $797,486, but the
corresponding value for option A is only $98,077.
27 Lower values for κ have slower mean-reversion, e.g. κ = 0.02 corresponds to a characteristic time to mean
revert of φ = 0.02−1/4 = 12.5 years if time-steps are quarterly.
28 This effect is only evident for values of κ below a certain bound, depending on the utility function and
other real option parameters. For the parameter choice of Fig. 4 the invest-at-market-price option values have
their usual negative sensitivity to σ once κ exceeds approximately 2, where the characteristic time to mean
revert is 1/8th of a year or less. Detailed results are not reported for lack of space, but are available from the
authors on request.
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Table 4 Comparison of invest option values for project A (κ = 1/10, σ = 20%) and project B (κ = 1/40,
σ = 40%) with λ = 0.4 or 0.8
λ 0.4 0.8 ∞
A B A B A B
Exponential 30,421 12,952 52,732 43,947 98,077 797,486
Hyperbolic 33,526 17,563 55,230 58,909
Power 33,045 16,651 56,365 68,051
Logarithmic 19,890 21,260 56,986 73,131
All other parameter values are the same as in Fig. 4. For each utility we highlight the preferred project in bold
However, once we relax the risk-neutral assumption the ranking of these two investment
opportunities may change, depending on the utility of the decision maker. The real option
values for risk-averse decision makers with high risk tolerance (λ = 0.8) or low risk tolerance
(λ = 0.4) are shown in Table 4. In each case the greater option value is depicted in bold.
This shows that an investor with a logarithmic utility would also prefer project B, as would
an investor with a relatively high risk tolerance (λ = 0.8) and a hyperbolic or a power utility.
In all other cases the decision maker would prefer project A.
6 Summary and conclusion
The value of an investment real option is the net present value that, if received with certainty,
would give a risk-averse decision maker the same utility value as the expected utility of the
uncertain investment. Such values enable the decision maker to rank opportunities to invest
in alternative projects and the process of valuing the option also specifies an optimal time
to exercise. The minimum value of zero applies when the project would not be attractive
whatever its future value.
The special case of RNV, while most commonly employed in the literature, only applies
to a real option that is tradable on a secondary market. Therefore, we introduce a general
methodology with applications to a wide range of private investment or divestment decisions
where project risks are based on a source of uncertainty which cannot be hedged. It permits
risk-averse private companies, publicly-funded entities, or individuals to compute a real
option value that is completely tailored to the decision maker, based on a very flexible risk
preference model (HARA), where views on the dynamics of the project price process can
take several forms and with investment costs that have both fixed and variable components.
In this paradigm, ROVs can be very different from the risk-neutral price obtained under the
standard but (typically) invalid assumption of perfectly-hedgeable risks. This is significant
because such decisions can have profound implications for the decision maker’s economic
welfare. For instance, an individual’s investment in housing may represent a major component
of her wealth and should not be viewed simply in expected net present value terms, nor should
all uncertainties be based on systematic risk because they are largely un-hedgeable. Private
companies typically generate returns and risks that have a utility value that is specific to the
owners’ outlook. Likewise, publicly-funded entities may have objectives that are far removed
from wealth maximisation under risk-neutrality.
The real option price that is obtained using standard RNV assumptions can be very much
greater than or less than the value that would be found using a more realistic assumptions about
investment costs in an incomplete market, and very often the RNV approach would specify a
later investment time. When risks cannot be hedged, the risk-averse decision maker’s ranking
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of different real options depends heavily on how her risk tolerance changes with wealth, and
so it becomes necessary to employ a HARA utility function in order to capture this feature
of model risk.
We have introduced a very general ROV model and applied it to answer several important
questions relating to the model risk in real option models, many of which have not previously
been addressed. Our main conclusions can be summarised as follows:
(i) The assumption about the investment cost, whether it is pre-determined or stochastic,
has a significant influence on the real option value. The pre-determined-strike assump-
tion can significantly over-estimate the value of a real option when the more-appropriate
assumption is that the investment cost is positively related to the market price, or has
both a fixed and variable components. Fixed-strike options may be more realistic for a
decision maker having significant market power, who can use this power to influence
the investment cost in her favour. Intuitively, real options can be more valuable for
those decision makers—less powerful decision makers have to bear more uncertainty
in investment costs.
(ii) It is important to account for the flexibility of the decision-making process in real
option analysis because the real option value increases with the frequency of decision
opportunities. Hence, due to operational reasons (e.g. infrequent board meetings), in
reality, the real option value should be much lower than the standard continuous-time,
risk-neutral value.
(iii) ROVs within the HARA class are bounded above by logarithmic utility-based option
values with the (more usual) exponential utility-based option values providing only a
lower bound. The option value function is a convex (concave) monotonically increasing
function of risk tolerance when investment costs are perfectly correlated (uncorrelated)
with the project value.
(iv) The value of the project relative to the decision maker’s wealth matters a great deal.
For instance, the smaller (greater) the risk tolerance of the decision maker, the higher
she ranks the option to invest in a relatively low-priced (high-priced) project, when the
project price dynamics follow the same GBM process. Intuitively, the more risk averse,
the more the decision maker would favour a small project over a more valuable but
costly one, even if two projects are exposed to the same risks.
(v) Under the GBM assumption the sensitivity of a fixed-strike real option to the volatility
of the market price may be always positive (as in the RNV approach) but there are
some cases when it may be always negative. This sensitivity increases as risk aversion
increases. Our framework is flexible enough to capture both positive and negative
volatility effect on the ROV;
(vi) Projects with values which trend strongly over long periods of time tend to be less
attractive to risk-averse investors than those with mean-reverting project values. When
projects value mean-revert the option value can increase or decrease with risk tolerance,
depending on the cost structure.
To aid further research in the area of decision-tree analysis for real options valuation, Matlab
code for all the examples can be downloaded by the reader and the parameters may be
changed to any reasonable value, set by the user in order to compute values for particular
real options that are formulated to model real-world decision problems. This way, we could
generate any number of specific results on model risk in real option valuation. For instance,
our model (and our Matlab code) could be adapted to value stock options which are held by
managers and shareholders who have different risk preferences and hence assess how much
value is lost when compensation costs more to the shareholders than the certainty-equivalent
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value placed by the manager. Numerous other real option valuation problems can be likewise
addressed, such as technology innovation (Boer 2000; Krysiak 2008), merger and acquisition
(Ikenberry and Vermaelen 1996; Morellec and Zhdanov 2005), pharmaceutical research and
development (McGrath and Nerkar 2004), as well as option compensation (Kahl et al. 2003;
Conrad 2000; Ingersoll 2006; Meulbroek 2001). The purpose of this paper is not to deal with
any specific application. Rather, we develop a very general model and use it to assess the
implications on a real option value of using the wrong model parameters, and risk-neutral
valuation with GBM in particular.
OpenAccess This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide
a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix: numerical examples
To fix ideas, here we depict some simple decision trees representing different types of real
options. In this section we shall only illustrate the simple cost structure (7) with α = 0 and
g(x) = x , i.e. the transacted price is the market price of the project. Matlab code is available
from the authors for these and the more complex examples included in the paper.
First we consider a decision opportunity which provides a concrete example of the zero-
correlation case considered by Grasselli (2011), where the opportunity to invest should still
have a positive value. A second example shows that the equivalent divest decision also has a
positive value. The tables in this section rank competing projects by computing ROVs under
various assumptions: (i) the decision-maker’s (subjective) market price for each alternative
follows the dynamics (1) with a different (project-specific) expected returns μ and volatilities
σ . We also consider competing projects with different dividends δ; (ii) the decision-maker
has risk tolerance λ = 0.4, i.e. a local absolute risk aversion of 2.5; and (iii) her initial wealth
is equal to the current market price of the project, with w0 = p0 = $1 m; the risk-free
interest rate is constant, r = 5% and exercise opportunities occur each time the underlying
price moves. We conclude this section by showing how options with negative cash flows,
such as a pharmaceutical research project or land development, are represented in our general
framework.
Positive cash flows
Figures 5 and 6 depict two short-horizon decision trees for the invest and divest options on
a project that yields positive cash flows. For instance, the project could be the purchase of
real-estate with regular positive cash flows, such as a buy-to-let residential or office block, or
a car park where fees accrue to its owner for its usage. Rents, denoted xs(t) in the trees, are
captured using a positive, constant dividend yield defined by (6), to capture rents that only
increase/decrease in line with the market price. We suppose cash flows are not re-invested
and instead earn the risk-free rate. Each time a cash flow is paid the market price jumps down
from p+t to p−t = p+t − xt . Between payments the decision maker expects the discounted
market price to grow at rate μ − r , and based on the discretisation (2) we have p+t+1 = up−t
or p+t+1 = dp−t with equal probability. The terminal nodes of the tree are associated with the
increment in wealth w − w0 where the final wealth w is given (8) for the option to invest
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Fig. 5 Option to invest in a property that pays rents, xs(t). T ′ = 3, T = 2, k = 1. Terminal nodes labelled
with (w − w0), cash flows given by (8) with with CF = x following decision to invest (I ), and 0 otherwise
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Fig. 6 Option to sell a property paying rents, xs(t). T ′ = 3, T = 2, k = 1. Terminal nodes labelled (w − w0),
cash-flows are (10) with CF = x if the owner remains invested (R), or if the owner sells the property (S) the
cash-flow is difference between the selling price and initial price
in Fig. 5, and by (10) for the option to divest (setting the cash flow equal to the rent in each
state) depicted in Fig. 6.
Table 5 applies the decision trees in Figs. 5 and 6 to rank the options to buy (Fig. 5) and to
sell (Fig. 6) two different buy-to-let properties. In each case rents are paid every six months,
and are set at a constant percentage δ of the market price at the time the rent is paid. But
the investor has different views about the future market price and rents on each property, as
characterised by different values for μ, σ and δ.
Similarly, we rank the decisions (depicted in Fig. 6) to sell two different properties,
according to the subjective views on market prices and rents specified in the second pair
of columns in Table 5. The divest ROV is the expected utility value of capital gains on the
property plus the expected utility value of the opportunity to divest with the value of the
preferred property marked in bold.
Clearly, the form assumed for the utility function has material consequences for decision
making. A decision maker with CARA utility would prefer the option to buy the second
property, whilst decision makers with any of the other HARA utilities (and the same risk
tolerance at time 0) would prefer to buy the first property. And for the divest real option
values of two other properties both currently owned by the decision maker, all decision
makers except those with a logarithmic utility would favour selling the first property.
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Table 5 Columns 2 and 3
compare the values of 2 real
options, each to purchase a
buy-to-let property as depicted in
Fig. 5
Invest (%) Divest (%)
σ 40 25 30 20
μ 15 10 15 10
δ 10 10 20 10
Exponential 289 316 6775 6052
Hyperbolic 348 339 6610 6103
Power 340 336 7283 6296
Logarithmic 358 345 4286 5330
Columns 4 and 5 compare the values of 2 other options, each to sell
a buy-to-let property currently owned, as in Fig. 6. In each case our
decision-maker has λ = 0.4 and w0 = $1 m, each property has p0 =
$1 m and r = 5%. The decision maker’s beliefs about μ, σ and δ
depend on the property. For each utility we highlight in bold the preferred
location for buying (or selling) the property
Negative cash flows
In the buy-to-develop case there are no cash flows until the research and development of a
pharmaceutical project starts, or the building plot is purchased. Thereafter, these negative
cash flows should be accounted for in the market price. Setting a negative, constant dividend
yield cannot capture these properties. Instead, the market price following an invest decision
is cum-dividend, but prior to this it evolves as in the zero cash-flow case. Another important
realism to include in the decision-tree is that the investment horizon T ′ is path dependent
now, because it depends on the time of the investment to buy the rights. For instance, it could
take 2 years to develop the drug after purchasing the patent rights.
A simple buy-to-develop option is depicted in Fig. 7, in which the development cost is
yzs(t) > 0 and p˜t is the cum-dividend market price. The option maturity T is 2 periods, and
so is the development time, so T ′ varies from 2 to 4 periods depending on the time that the
project begins. To keep the tree simple we suppose that development costs are paid only once,
after 1 period, to allow for planning time after purchasing the rights. For example, consider
the node labelled Du that arises if the investor does not purchase the rights at t = 0 and
subsequently the market price moves up at t = 1. A decision to invest at this time leads to
four possible outcomes. For instance, following the dotted red lines, if the price moves up
again at t = 2 the development cost at this time is yuu , based on the market price of uup0.
But if the price subsequently moves down at t = 3, the terminal value of the property is
p˜1,uud = d(uup0 + yuu) and the costs are the sum of the price paid for the land and the
development cost, i.e. up0 + yuu .
Table 6 displays some numerical results for the decision tree in Fig. 7, reporting the value
of two options to buy-to-develop a project, each with initial market price $1 million and
r = 5%, but the options have different μ, σ and development costs δ. In each case the
development takes one year in total with the costs paid six months after purchase. In general,
a higher development cost for given μ and σ decreases the buy-to-develop option value, and
the decision maker becomes more likely to defer investment until the market price falls. But
the option value also increases with μ and decreases with σ . We find that option A is preferred
by an decision maker with an exponential or logarithmic utility whereas option B is preferred
by an decision maker with a hyperbolic or a power utility. Hence, different investors that
have identical wealth, share the same initial risk tolerance, and hold the same views about
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Fig. 7 Decision tree depicting the option to invest in a project for development. If the rights to development are
acquired (I ) the development takes 2 periods and development costs occur only after the first period. Terminal
nodes are associated with the P&L, w − w0 resulting from the decision
development costs and the evolution of market prices may again rank the values of two
development options differently, just because their risk tolerance has different sensitivity to
changes in wealth.
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Table 6 Value comparison of real
options to buy two different rights
for developing a patent for an
R&D project, depicted in Fig. 7
A B
σ 25% 15%
μ 10% 35%
δ 20% 40%
Exponential 289 182
Hyperbolic 299 326
Power 315 350
Logarithmic 41 0
In each case our decision-maker has λ = 0.4 and w0 = $1 m, each
project has p0 = $1 m and r = 5%. The decision maker’s views on μ,
σ and development costs δ differ for each project, as shown in the table.
The preferred option is indicated by the value in bold
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